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CASE NOTES
PATENTS-UTILITY REQUIREMENT-COMPARISON BETWEEN
CHEMICAL AND NON-CHEMICAL INVENTIONS
On March 3, 1959, chemists Kirk and Petrow filed with the United States
Patent Office a patent application for certain steroid compounds.' The appli-
cation stated that the claimed steroids were a new class of compounds often
possessing high biological activity. The steroids were also asserted to be of
value as intermediates in the preparation of biologically active compounds,
and thus were useful in the furtherance of steroidal research. Although the
Patent Office Examiner admitted that the compounds were new and unob-
vious to those skilled in the art of steroidal chemistry, and thus were the
product of invention, all claims in the application were rejected on the ground
that the claimed compounds did not satisfy the statutory test of being useful,'
commonly referred to as the utility requirement. Upon affirmation by the
Patent Office Board of Appeals, the two applicants appealed to the United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.). In a three-two
decision, the C.C.P.A. affirmed the Patent Office's position, and denied the
applicants a patent.- In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 153 U.S.P.Q. 48 and 266
(C.C.P.A. 1967).
In a companion case, decided concurrently with the Kirk case, applicants
Joly and Warnant, on January 9, 1961, had filed for a patent. The patent
application 4 covered a number of steroidal compounds and a method or
process for making the steroids. The application disclosed that the claimed
'Serial No. 796,749, entitled "1-Dehydro-6-Methyl Steroid Compounds." A steroid
is any of numerous organic compounds containing the carbon ring system of various
alcohols found in lipids, which with proteins and carbohydrates constitute the principal
structural components of living cells.
235 U.S.C. § 101 (1964): "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title." (Emphasis added.)
3The decision also dealt with 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1964), concerning the legal adequacy
of a patent application to disclose how to use the invention, not within the purview of
this note. Section 112 requires in part: "The specification shall contain a written descrip-
tion of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which
it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and
shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention."
4 Serial No. 81,272, entitled "Esters of 2-Enols of delta' Steroids and Preparation
Thereof."
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compounds were useful as intermediates in the preparation of certain other
steroids, and during prosecution the applicants contended that the steroids
which could be prepared from the claimed compounds were closely related in
chemical structure to compounds having known useful properties, namely,
cortisone and prednisone. The Patent Office Board of Appeals, though finding
both the product and the process for making it to be new and unobvious to
research chemists, upheld the Examiner's rejection of the application on the
basis that the claimed steroids were not useful under the patent statute.5 The
C.C.P.A. affirmed the Board of Appeals. In re Joly, 376 F.2d 906, 153
U.S.P.Q. 45 and 243 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
In deciding both cases, the C.C.P.A. was especially concerned with the
applicability of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Brenner v.
Manson,8 which involved a chemical invention totally lacking in utility. Al-
though the patent applications in both the Kirk and Joly cases disclosed some
utility for the chemical compounds, the C.C.P.A. expanded on statements in
the Manson case, and in so doing expressly overruled a number of its earlier
decisions on this subject.7 The present cases are therefore noteworthy in that
they establish new standards of utility, discussed hereinafter, to be applied in
the future to all chemical inventions.
It has been advanced in general terms that chemical inventions are held to
a more strict standard of utility than required for non-chemical inventions.8
Significantly, only one constitutional9 and statutory'0 requirement exists for
all patents. The purpose of this note is to analyze decisions in which utility
was a patent issue in non-chemical fields to determine the standard required
for non-chemical inventions. This standard can then be compared with the
5 Supra note 2.
8383 U.S. 519, 148 U.S.P.Q. 689 (1966).
7 In re Adams, 316 F.2d 476, 137 U.S.P.Q. 333 (C.C.P.A. 1963); In re Szwarc, 319 F.2d
277, 138 U.S.P.Q. 208 (C.C.P.A. 1963); In re Wilke, 314 F.2d 558, 136 U.S.P.Q. 435
(C.C.P.A. 1963). In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 126 U.S.P.Q. 242 (C.C.P.A. 1960). "[T]o
the extent that those decisions are inconsistent with Brenner v. Manson (supra note 6)
and the views expressed herein, they must be, and are, overruled." In re Kirk, 376 F.2d
936, 946, 153 U.S.P.Q. 48, 56 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
S Dissenting opinion of Judge Smith in the Joly case, in the subsection entitled "The
Patent Statute Applies Equally to All Inventors Without Regard to the Technical Fields
to Which Their Inventions Relate," 376 F.2d 906, 929, 153 U.S.P.Q. 45 and 260
(C.C.P.A. 1967). Cf. Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Brenner v. Manson,
supra note 6, at 536-40, 148 U.S.P.Q. at 696-98, expressing concern for the impact that
the majority opinion may have on chemical research.
9 U.S. CocsT. art. 1, § 8. "The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. (Emphasis added.)
lo Supra note 2.
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present standard for chemical inventions to determine if a divergence has in
fact occurred. The consequences of a stricter standard of utility for chemical
inventions could be far reaching. Without the incentive conferred by patent
protection, industry may become less willing to expend funds and manpower
in the pursuit of basic chemical research.
The standard of utility now required for chemical inventions can be dis-
cerned from the language of the court in the present cases. At one time, organic
compounds were regarded as inherently patentably useful as intermediates
for preparing other compounds." In the ioly case, however, the court specifi-
cally rejected the position that a chemical compound used as an intermediate
to make other compounds is useful per se, without regard to the usefulness of
the final product.' 2 It also cannot be presumed that a chemical compound is
useful simply because the compound is closely related only in a structural
sense to other compounds of known usefulness.' 3
The court started with the concept that to be patentable, an invention must
have substantial utility. Until it is refined and developed to this point, namely,
where specific benefit exists in currently available form, there is insufficient
justification to grant a patent.1 4 Developing this concept into new standards,
the court found that compounds useful to chemists doing research, which can
produce other compounds which are members of a general class, some members
of which are known to have useful therapeutic properties, are not patentably
useful. The fact that the general class of compounds as a whole is the subject
of scientific inquiry and is the object of present research does not turn the
scales in favor of usefulness.' 5 The Kirk court drew the line of demarcation in
favor of compounds employed as intermediates to produce other directly use-
ful compounds.' 6
Some language in the present decisions, however, gives warning that what
is useful may be further qualified by other conditions. A class or number of
related organic intermediates may be used to produce several final products,
depending on the manner in which an organic chemist directs the reactions.
The court appears to, endorse the position that all final products produced
11 Dissenting opinion of Judge Rich, In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 947, 952, 153 U.S.P.Q. 266,
270 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
12376 F.2d 906, 908, 153 U.S.P.Q. 45, 47 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
13 In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 942, 153 U.S.P.Q. 48, 53 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
14 Id. at 945, 153 U.S.P.Q. at 55, citing Brenner v. Manson, supra note 6.
151 d. at 945, 153 U.S.P.Q. at 56, "Nor is it enough that the product disclosed to be
obtained from the intermediate belongs to some class of compounds which now is, or
in the future might be, the subject of research to determine some specific use."
161d. at 946, 153 U.S.P.Q. at 56, approving Reiners v. Mehitretter, 236 F.2d 418,
111 U.S.P.Q. 97 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
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from a class of intermediates must be useful in order for the intermediate
class itself to be useful.' 7
Although chemical inventions are, due to their nature, more apt to give rise
to utility problems, questions concerning the utility of a product or a process
are not inherently different in non-chemical areas. Fully aware that exact
equivalence may not be realized, it is believed that an analysis of decisions on
utility of non-chemical inventions will provide an important tool for judging
the propriety of the court's decisions, and serve as a guide in determining
whether chemical inventions are in fact being discriminated against as com-
pared with inventions in other fields of science, with respect to the utility
requirement.
The requirement that an invention must be useful has always existed in the
statutory scheme,' 8 and in essentally the identical form found in the present
patent statute.19 For this reason, decisions from even the earliest date are
valid today in determining the nature of utility, and the standard which has
evolved in defining it.
At the outset, a few general observations may be made regarding the nature
of the utility requirement. Utility is a question of fact for the court, rather
than a question of law.20 Several factual situations usually associated only
with chemical inventions find direct analogy in the non-chemical arts, and the
rules of law applicable to them are the same. Intermediates, that is, a product
which is only temporarily useful in making another product, are patentable.
For this reason, a patent was issued on a joint construction for a motor
vehicle chassis, which served to maintain the chassis in an assembled state
only until rivets could be swaged to permanently hold the chassis together. 21
Similarly, joints and blanks which of themselves have no commercial status,
but are only useful as intermediates in forming other products, are patent-
17 In In re Kirk, supra note 13, at 943, 153 U.S.P.Q. at 54, the court disposes of the
argument that the intermediates are useful because the 6-methyl aromatic steroids
produced therefrom are members of a class of aromatic estrogen compounds, some of
which are used commercially. "But appellants have not disclosed or otherwise shown
that any 6-methyl aromatic steroid which can be produced from their intermediates
possesses activities in common with those commercial members of the aromatic steroid
series."
18 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. 459 (1966).
See Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109; Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318;
Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117; Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198.
19Supra note 2.
20 Lorenz v. General Steel Products Co., 337 F.2d 726, 143 U.S.P.Q. 140 (5th Cir.
1964); Harley Loney Co. v. Ravenscroft, 162 F.2d 703, 74 U.S.P.Q. 47 (7th Cir. 1947);
Gordon Form Lathe Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 133 F.2d 487, 56 U.S.P.Q. 495 (6th Cir.),
aff'd, 320 U.S. 714 (1943); See Armour & Co. v. Wilson & Co., 274 F.2d 143, 124 U.S.P.Q.
115 (7th Cir. 1960) (not modifying utility rule in Harley Loney Co., supra).
21 Ex parte Mueller, 57 U.S.P.Q. 154 (Pat. Bd. App. 1942).
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able.2 2 Finally, it makes no difference whether the invention relates to a
product, i.e., the thing itself, or to a process for making the product, since the
patenting of a process is not limited to chemical inventions.23 In fact, it may
be only the mechanical process which is patentable, and not the mechanical
product, as when the product itself is old. 24
In view of the statutory requirement, it is axiomatic that an invention
which completely lacks utility is not patentable. Patents are not granted for
discoveries of abstract laws or principles of nature, which are mere items of
knowledge, and, without being employed, lack utility.25 A patent will not
be granted where the sole purpose of a device is to deceive the public, and
the courts will look beyond form to the actual substance of the invention.2 6
Where it is shown that only one component in a combination is novel,
that component must be shown to be useful for the purposes for which the
invention is useful, or the invention will lack utility. Thus, if the novel
component has no use which is an advantage to the invention, 27 or is in fact
detrimental to the operation of the combination,28 no patent can issue. If a
device is completely inoperative in that it will not work as disclosed, it will
be rejected on the basis that it lacks utility.2 9 The fact that small modifi-
cations would make the device operative will not thereby make the device
22 Id. at 155. Cf. Wright Co. v. Herring-Curtiss Co., 204 F. 597 (W.D.N.Y. 1913),
aff'd, 211 F. 654 (2d Cir. 1914) (pioneer patent to Orville and Wilbur Wright for an
airplane) holding a claimed subcombination valid though it was not useful unless em-
bodied in a complete device.
23 Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366 (1908) (process for making ex-
panded sheet metal by a series of mechanical steps).
241n re Holmes, 63 F.2d 642, 16 U.S.P.Q. 399 (C.C.P.A. 1933) (process for manu-
facturing U-shaped pipe).
2 5 Buck v. Ooms, 63 F. Supp. 715, 68 U.S.P.Q. 25 (D.D.C. 1945), aff'd, 159 F.2d 462,
72 U.S.P.Q. 211 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (alleged law of siphonic action).
26 Scott & Williams v. Aristo Hosiery, 7 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1925) (seamless stocking
with imitative seam); National Battery Co. v. Western Molded Products, Inc., 39
F. Supp. 954, 50 U.S.P.Q. 445 (S.D. Cal. 1941), aff'd on other grounds, 132 F.2d 510,
56 U.S.P.Q. 259 (9th Cir. 1942) (inlay for battery case to simulate integral container).
27 The Automatic Devices Corp. v. Sinko Tool & Manufacturing Co., 112 F.2d 335,
45 U.S.P.Q. 394 (7th Cir. 1940), aff'd, 314 U.S. 94 (1941) (cigar lighter); Imperial
Stonecutters, Inc. v. Schwartz, 370 F.2d 425, 152 U.S.P.Q. 91 (8th Cir. 1966) (stonecutter).
28 Schaefer Inc. v. Mohawk Cabinet Co., Inc., 276 F.2d 204, 125 U.S.P.Q. 318 (2d Cir.
1960) (refrigerated display cabinet); Ex parte Massa, 48 U.S.P.Q. 331 (Pat. Bd. App.
1940) (loudspeaker). But see In re Eller, 299 F.2d 272, 132 U.S.P.Q. 467 (C.C.P.A. 1962)
(storage battery).
291n re Spence, 261 F.2d 244, 120 U.S.P.Q. 82 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (flexible coupling).
However, if a court is not completely convinced that the invention cannot operate as
claimed, but has suspicions to that effect, it may refuse a patent based on failure to
adequately disclose how to use the invention, under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1964). See In re
Wooddy, 331 F.2d 636, 141 U.S.P.Q. 518 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (subterranean salt mining
using cavern created by nuclear explosion).
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useful, since the inventor, presumably one skilled in the art, did not make
such changes, and because a patent must disclose a workable device.3 0
There is general agreement that some use, i.e., anything greater than com-
plete lack of utility, satisfies the requirement that an invention be useful,
regardless of its technical subject area. An authoritative dictionary, in use
at the time of the drafting of the constitutional provision for patents,3
defines "useful" as helpful to any purpose. 32 Similarly, the courts have held
that the only utility requirement is that the article itself (or the process)
must be useful, and whether it is more or less useful than other articles is
unimportant.3 3 The utility requirement has been characterized in a different
manner. The earliest American case on utility is Lowell v. Lewis, 34 in which
Judge Story made his famous statement: "all that the law requires is that
the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the well being, good
policy or sound morals of society.13 5 In another early decision, Judge Story
held that the law does not look to the degree of utility.36
An invention may be imperfect in form, but still patentable. Usefulness
implies practicality, as distinguished from perfection.3 7 The first telephone,
disclosed in a patent to Alexander Graham Bell, was unquestionably a crude,
imperfect device. The Supreme Court, in upholding the validity of the
patent, held that an inventor need not have brought his invention to the
highest degree of perfection, but it would be sufficient if he described his
invention with sufficient clearness and precision to enable one to understand
30 General Steel Products Co., Inc. v. Lorenz, 204 F. Supp. 518, 132 U.S.P.Q. 574
(S.D. Fla. 1962), aff'd, 337 F.2d 726, 143 U.S.P.Q. 140 (5th Cir. 1964) (multiple position
chair).
3 1 Supra note 9.
32 See WALKER, PATENTS 493 (2d ed. Deller 1964).
33Lamb Knit Goods v. Lamb Glove & Mitten, 120 F. 267 (6th Cir. 1902) (knitted
glove); Accord, Blanchard v. Ooms, 153 F.2d 651, 68 U.S.P.Q. 314 (D.C. Cir. 1946)
(portable radio antenna) where utility is the only factor necessary to establish patent-
ability. Cf. Court's footnote 1 in In re Ratti, 270 F.2d 810, 123 U.S.P.Q. 349 (C.C.P.A.
1959) (oil seal).
34 15 F. Cas. 1018 (No. 8568) (C.C.D. Mass. 1817). See generally Marshall, Compara-
tive Utility as a Requisite of Patentability, 1 J. PAT. OF. Soc'Y 550 (1919) for early
American decisions on the law of utility.
3 5 Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (No. 8568) (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (water
pump). But see Brenner v. Manson, supra note 6 at 533, 148 U.S.P.Q. at 695, for a
disparaging comment on Judge Story's definition of utility.
36 Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37 (No. 1217) (1st Cir. 1817) (manufacture of boots).
87 Curtiss Wright Corp. v. Link Aviation, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 106, 124 U.S.P.Q. 266
(N.D.N.Y. 1959) (blind flight airplane simulator); General Electric Co. v. George J.
Hagan Co., 38 F.2d 995, 3 U.S.P.Q. 227 (W.D. Pa. 1929) (electric resistance furnace).
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the invention and some practical way of putting it into operation, which
Bell had done. 3
8
The fact that an invention could be improved, as by eliminating a pos-
sibly superfluous element, does not affect utility.3 9 In Mergenthaler Linotype
Co. v. The Press Publishing Co.,40 the court strongly rejected the argument
that an invention was valueless because not perfect, and listed many great
inventions, each of which were extremely crude in the form disclosed in the
patent, and though subsequently improved, were greatly deserving of patent
protection. The court pointed out that none of the great inventions could
have survived years later in the market in their original form.
It is unsettled whether an invention must eventually become a commer-
cial success in order to evidence sufficient utility to uphold a patent. Some
courts have unequivocally stated that commercial success is not necessary
to sustain a patent.41 Other courts have in effect reached the same conclu-
sions in holding that the fact that an invention may be more costly than
prior apparatus does not establish the absence of utility.42
In Seymour v. Osborne,43 the Supreme Court, in holding four improvement
patents valid, stated that an invention must be capable of being beneficially
used for the purposes for which it was designed, as the law does not require
that the invention should be of such general utility as to supersede all other
inventions which accomplish the same object. Later, in Hildreth v. Mas-
toras,44 the Court upheld a generic or pioneer patent, stating that the device
does not have to be a commercial success, it being enough if it actually and
mechanically performs, though only crudely, the important functions by
which it makes substantial changes in the art.
Hartford-Empire Co. v. Obear-Nester Glass Co. 45 involved a patent for
feeding molten glass to molds. The apparatus was of refractory material,
88 Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1887). See Claude Neon Electrical Products, Inc. v.
Brilliant Tube Sign Co., 48 F.2d 176, 8 U.S.P.Q. 512 (9th Cir. 1931), rev'd, 40 F.2d 708,
5 U.S.P.Q. 37 (W.D. Wash. 1930) (basic patent on neon tube lamp).
89 Ex parte White and Falconer, 55 U.S.P.Q. 96 (Pat. Bd. App. 1942) (electrical relay
circuit).
40 57 F. 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1893) (type casting machine).
4 1 1n re Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457, 108 U.S.P.Q. 321 (C.C.P.A. 1956), patent denied on
other grounds, 306 F.2d 908, 134 U.S.P.Q. 515 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (nuclear fission chain
reactor); Union Sulphur Co. v. Freeport Texas Co., 251 F. 634 (D. Del. 1918), modified
on other grounds, 255 F. 961 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 618 (1919) (sulphur mining).
42 Ex parte Markowitz, 143 U.S.P.Q. 303 (Pat. Bd. App. 1964) (magnetic core memory).
43 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516 (1871) (reaping and harvesting machines).
44257 U.S. 27 (1921) (candy-pulling machine).
45 71 F.2d 539, 22 U.S.P.Q. 270 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 625 (1935).
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which the Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit concluded must be of
clay composition and rather frangible. The court then stated that such a
situation was not tolerable in commercial production, and held that "useful"
in the patent law means that a machine will accomplish the purpose prac-
tically when applied in industry, and a machine is not useful if from its
inherent nature it will accomplish the purpose only to such a restricted
extent as to make its use in industry prohibitive. In attempting to reconcile
the Hartford-Empire decision with earlier Supreme Court decisions, the
Sixth Circuit adopted the Eighth Circuit's test of practical usefulness in
industry, but held that the test did not apply in the case of a generic
patent.46
Whether practical usefulness in industry is a proper test of utility is open
to considerable doubt, especially in view of numerous earlier decisions mak-
ing no distinction between whether the invention involved was generic or
not. In a later decision from the Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit, an
invention which the court found was of small coverage and of even smaller
importance was held to possess utility, since it was not the extent of utility
that governed, but the existence of some utility.47
No conclusion of general non-utility can follow from one unsuccessful
experiment in which the invention failed, and the fact that an ultimately
impractical suggestion was also included in the patent does not vitiate the
invention or the patent.48 The invention may at times not operate satisfac-
torily, but absent total incapacity, a patent cannot be struck down for non-
operativeness or non-utility. 49
The holding of the Kirk court, to the effect that products are not patentable
if useful only to research chemists in the furtherance of basic chemical re-
search, appears to be somewhat at odds with the tenor of the cases dis-
cussed above. When a chemical compound is actually useful to research
chemists, it would seem to have specific benefit in currently available form,
adequate to satisfy the constitutional directive that a patent must promote
the progress of the useful arts.r ° Certainly many non-chemical products which
46 The Cleveland Punch & Shear Works Co. v. E. W. Bliss Co., 145 F.2d 991, 64
U.S.P.Q. 77 (6th Cir. 1944) (sheet metal drawing press).
47 Ostby & Barton Co. v. Jungersen, 163 F.2d 312, 75 U.S.P.Q. 151 (3d Cir. 1947)
(coin selector).
48Hunt Tool Co. v. Lawrence, 242 F.2d 347, 113 U.S.P.Q. 7 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd
on this ground, 142 F. Supp. 329, 111 U.S.P.Q. 37 (S.D. Tex. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S.
910 (1957) (method of removing oil well liners).
49 Technical Tape Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 143 F. Supp. 429, 110 U.S.P.Q.
260 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 247 F.2d 343, 114 U.S.P.Q. 422 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 952 (1958) (pressure-sensitive adhesive tape).
50 Supra note 9.
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seem less likely to promote the progress of science have been held useful. For
example, games played for innocent amusement, and which provide a means
of relaxation, meet the statutory requirement of possessing patentable
utility.51
Merely because a product is useful only in a laboratory, and not in indus-
try, would not appear to be a reasonable basis for rejecting the product
as lacking utility. As the above cases illustrate, many non-chemical patents
have been upheld in which the inventions were in fact only laboratory curi-
osities. In Electro-Dynamic Co. v. U.S. Light and Heat Corp.,52 a patent
for an electrical circuit for automatically recharging storage batteries used
on train-lighting systems was attacked as lacking utility. Due to reasons
arising from rough passage of train cars over switches, the circuit stopped
charging too soon. In rejecting the argument that the invention was not
useful, the court said:
That it possesses no practical utility is fully proven. The scheme might be called
one of hope or aspiration; but the device will operate in a laboratory at least,
and we do not think the patent can be struck down as inoperative in the sense of
the patent law.53
The apparent approval in the Kirk case of the proposition that all final
products produced from a class of intermediates must be useful in order
for the intermediates themselves to be useful, seems to be contrary to the
standard applied to non-chemical inventions. A number of courts have con-
sidered the extent of utility, and have held that an invention need not be
capable of performing all the functions declared by the inventor, but rather
that the statutory requirement of utility is met if it accomplishes but one.54
In the case of Freedsman v. Overseas Scientific Corp.,5 5 a patent claimed
dentures with magnets in the plates to assist in holding the dentures against
the contiguous ridge of the jaw on which it was designed to ride. It was
proven that for certain patients with slight bony ridges, the magnetic den-
tures did not give satisfactory results. However, in other cases involving
patients having a different ridge structure, the device was distinctly help-
ful. The court held this was enough to uphold the patent against criticism;
51 Cusano v. Kotler, 159 F.2d 159, 72 U.S.P.Q. 62 (3d Cir. 1947) (game board);
Callison v. T. J. Dean Novelty Co., 70 F.2d 55, 21 U.S.P.Q. 240 (10th Cir. 1934) (game
with aerial projectiles).
52278 F. 80 (2d Cir. 1921).
53 Id. at 85.
54 Decker Products Co. v. FTC, 176 F.2d 461, 81 U.S.P.Q. 519 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 878 (1949) (vehicle exhaust attachment); Ex parte Quinn, 4 U.S.P.Q.
304 (Pat. Bd. App. 1930) (emergency control circuit); Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Satler, 21
F.2d 630 (D. Conn. 1927) (variable condenser).
55248 F.2d 274, 115 U.S.P.Q. 42 (2d Cir. 1957).
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the invention need not be unfailingly operable in all its applications. By
analogy, as long as one end product of an intermediate class which can
produce several end products is useful, the utility of the class would seem
to be proven.
Thus, a comparison of the case law concerning non-chemical inventions
with the rulings and trend evidenced in the present decisions does establish
that the standard of utility required for chemical inventions is diverging
from the standard of utility required for non-chemical inventions. The hold-
ing that chemical compounds are not patentable if useful only to chemists
in the furtherance of laboratory research is contrary to the decided cases
in non-chemical areas. These cases establish that a useful device does not
mean one that is perfect. The fact that an invention can be improved, and
perhaps only the improved form can compete in the market, does not negate
the utility of the original invention. Patents on many non-chemical inven-
tions have been upheld when the product disclosed in the patent was in
fact only a laboratory curiosity. In one case, a non-chemical invention useful
only in a laboratory was held to possess patentable utility. The present
decisions also depart from the standard of utility for non-chemical inven-
tions in approving the proposition that all final products must be useful in
order for a class of intermediates to be useful. The law in the non-chemical
field holds that if an invention is useful for any one purpose, the fact that
the same invention is not useful for other purposes is immaterial.
The trend thus appears to be against the patentability of chemical products
useful only to chemists doing basic research. One reason why the divergence
has occurred may be inferred from the general apprehension some courts
display when asked to grant a patent on a chemical invention which they
feel "may engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable area." 56 How-
ever, it would seem immaterial that an invention may become of greater
ultimate value than can now be foreseen. If an inventor should reap more
from a patent than was expected, it is because he has made a discovery
whose full importance was not originally appreciated. The effect of the
present decisions would seem to be to discourage expending funds on basic
chemical research, and rather concentrate on applied research which holds
greater promise of producing patentable products. In the long run, however,
such an approach would seem to retard rather than promote the progress
of science, since history has shown that scientific progress is dependent
upon discoveries flowing from basic research.
Ronald Wanke
56 Brenner v. Manson, supra note 6 at 534, 148 U.S.P.Q. at 695.
[Vol. XVII
